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Emergence is a well established though highly contested concept in science that is found in a 
range of disciplines from biology and artificial life to physics and complexity. It is not in doubt 
that emergence is of interest to other fields including design, though the manner of its relation to 
this discipline is much less clear and its effect remains an open question. 
This paper will argue that emergence has set in motion a shift in the way we understand design. 
Building on the theoretical and philosophical resources provided by Gilles Deleuze (1994) and 
Manuel Delanda (2002) in particular, emergence marks a reorientation in the techniques and 
practices of designing, away from the specific designation of an objects qualities, towards the 




Emergence is a well established though highly contested concept in science that is found in a 
range of disciplines from biology and artificial life to physics and complexity. It is not in doubt 
that emergence is of interest to other fields including design, though the manner of its relation to 
this discipline is much less clear and its effect remains an open question. Architecture or 
urbanism, for example, would place quite different demands on a concept like emergence than 
those placed on it by neuroscience. Whilst the former might engage with those aspects of 
emergence that pertain to the generation of form or pattern as it relates to a city; the later might 
try to explain the development of cognition as it relates to a substrate of neural networks. 
Silberstein and McGeever define emergence as follows: 
“…features of systems or wholes that possess causal capacities not reducible to any of 
the intrinsic causal capacities of the parts nor to any of the (reducible) relations between 
the parts. Emergent properties are properties of a system taken as a whole which exert a 
causal influence on the parts of the system consistent with, but distinct from, the causal 
capacities of the parts themselves.” (182) 
This paper will argue that emergence has set in motion a shift in the way we understand design. 
Building on the theoretical and philosophical resources provided by Gilles Deleuze (1994) and 
Manuel Delanda (2002) in particular, emergence marks a reorientation in the techniques and 
practices of designing, away from the specific designation of an objects qualities, towards the 
specific designation of an environment in which the object’s qualities might emerge from a 
range of potentialities. These environments are simply mathematical spaces whose properties 
we can both describe and attach meaning to. Though fields like biology (Strogatz 1994) or 
economics (Krugman 1996) might use these tools as analytical devices to gain information 
about complex phenomena (like the tendency for business agglomerations to form), in design 
the question of empirical use value takes on a different inflection since evaluation criteria are 
rarely self evident and not always quantifiable.  
With these qualifications regarding empirical status in mind, for designers emergence still marks 
a fundamental movement away from the direct production of form – what is being re-
conceptualised here is the mode of control over the designed object. Rather than manipulate 
the materiality of the object or the object’s representation directly, an emergent designer 
manipulates the properties of a mathematical space in which an infinite series of potential forms 
might be packed.1 The emergence or actualisation of a specific form out of this space is 
understood to be a contingent product of the self-organized interaction of the space’s different 
components. The danger here is that emergence comes to be understood as a naturalised 
model of formal development, authenticated via the intimate connection between the object and 
the world from which it emerges.2 
The shift away from the direct and directed production of the architectural artefact towards an 
engagement with the space in which the artefact exists as potential carries with it all the 
predictable revaluations of authorship that attend to many new mediums.  
In this instance however, what is new is the way questions regarding the status of control, 
continuity and difference can be posed.  
To claim that the production of some object is the natural consequence of a space or 
environmental field as represented digitally or mathematically, is to make a claim for a certain 
continuity between the environment and the objects that arise out of it. Emergence, crucially, 
would describe a mode in which this continuity is not simply the elaboration of that which 
already implicitly exists in the environment as a possibility, but the very creativity of the 
environment itself, its ability to self-generate pattern and form.  
In order to substantiate this claim for material creativity we would need to make an assessment 
of the qualities of the object produced with regards to the environment and decide whether this 
represented a novel development that could not be retrospectively explained by its initial state. 
In other words, because emergence is an account of the development of form, we would have 
to understand the history of the world or system that conspires to produce said form and decide 
whether the material sequence of this history is evidence of novelty or simple mechanical 
elaboration. Whilst a mechanical elaboration would be evidence of continuity, it would not be 
evidence of emergence because it would be reducible to the sum of the component interactions. 
Irreducibility is seen as key feature of ‘strong’ or ‘ontological’ forms of emergence, in that the 
behaviour of the system taken in total cannot be reduced to the sum of its component 
interactions. As Silberstein and McGeever note “(Ontological) …emergence therefore entails the 
failure of part-whole reductionism.” (182) 
Further, simple mechanical interaction is invariant with regards to time: time invariance or 
reversibility must follow from a deterministic and mechanical view of the world. If given a 
sequence of events, time plays no part in determining the properties of that sequence, then we 
can assume that given perfect knowledge with respect to any stage of the sequence we can 
clearly determine the properties of the sequence at other stages.  
This conception of time as nothing but a neutral container for the clockwork elaboration of a pre-
determined sequence has been critiqued in philosophy through the work of Henri Bergson 
(1959) and in science through the work of Ilya Prigogine (1996). Emergence on the other hand 
implies a conceptualisation of time that is irreducible to metric determination and more 
importantly works to drive differentiation.   
2 Epistemological emergence 
To explain this further it is worth introducing a distinction between the properly emergent and 
the epistemologically emergent (though this in itself will require further elaboration). The 
epistemologically emergent is that which can be explained by recourse to the history of the 
system, but that with regards to an observer is unanticipated.   
In other words the historical account of an object’s development, its morphogenesis, can be 
given through a description of the mechanical interaction of its components. Though the 
complexity of these interactions might mean that predictability is difficult, it does not mean that 
predictability is impossible, only that we have insufficient information to describe the system 
correctly. The difference between that which is difficult to predict because of complexity and that 
which is impossible to predict is crucial with regards to emergence. Whilst both might produce 
unexpected results with regards to an observer, only the latter would be evidence of novelty. 
This is because in the former case, it is the observational or descriptive apparatus that is blind 
with regards to the system, where as in the latter case, the system itself is blind with regards to 
its future. As Silberstein and McGeever note: 
“A property of an object or system is epistemologically emergent if the property is 
reducible to or determined by the intrinsic properties of the ultimate constituents of the 
object or system, while at the same time it is very difficult for us to explain, predict or 
derive the property on the basis of the ultimate constituents. Epistemologically emergent 
properties are novel only at a level of description. For example, even systems with very 
few parts and with simple mathematical rules can sometimes be said to exhibit 
epistemological emergence.” (186) 
With regards to digital design processes we should be careful to distinguish between the 
unanticipated and the unaccountable. The power of computational systems can regularly 
produce unanticipated effects in design processes, but these effects will be accounted for 
through the simple mechanical interaction of the systems codified components. 
3 Strong and weak emergence 
The higher order development that has been crudely referred to as the properly emergent can 
also said to exist in a variety of types. In order to produce a more nuanced understanding of 
what constitutes emergence we should distinguish between its strong and weak forms, not 
simply to construct contrasting categories for a taxonomy of emergent behaviour but to see how 
these categories pose two very different horizons for design.   
An example of weak emergence can be found in the use of analogue modelling techniques. 
At the Institute for Lightweight structures in Stuttgart Germany, Frei Otto (Bach and Otto 1988) 
has developed form finding techniques using simple material analogues like soap film that recall 
Antoni Gaudi’s inverted catenary model for the Sagrada Familia in Spain. Frei Otto’s use of 
soap film for these experiments takes advantage of the material tendencies of the soap 
molecules. At a molecular level soap molecules will arrange themselves into configurations that 
minimise energy bonds between them, the emergent effect at a macro level is that the soap film 
will find a form that minimises its surface area, thus ‘solving’ the problem of spanning a surface 
efficiently.  
There is a characteristic entanglement of scales at work here with energy minimisation at the 
level of the individual molecules driving a process structured by the surface tension of the 
components taken as a population- to produce an efficient configuration at the level of the total 
system. Though the shape of the surface might be changing in each case, the system is being 
focused on the same goal, namely optimisation. In fact the soap film will always move through a 
sequence of different volumes until it settles into its most efficient state. The time in which the 
soap film is ‘finding’ its equilibrium state can be thought of as a series of samples from a search 
space, in which each less efficient configuration is discarded for a more efficient one.  
What is important to note here is this notion of a search space or more correctly a state space. 
In the case of the soap film, the state space of possible configurations that the soap film 
‘explores’ is itself closed and stable.  Its closure is less relevant, this simply means that the 
potential types of shape the soap can acquire are bounded, what is more important is that it is 
stable. In other words the system will always be driving towards a single outcome, and that once 
this outcome has been actualised, the systems behaviour becomes locked in place.   
4 State spaces and search algorithms 
The concept of state spaces can be explained more fully through an example taken from the 
world of computer animation. Inverse kinematics is a means of defining relationships between 
parts in a digital computer model such that each component will at its joint propagate a force to 
its adjoining component. It is used to efficiently model the skeletal system of characters in 
animation because it provides an efficient way to control joint rotation between rigid elements. It 
is efficient because inverse kinematics, unlike forward kinematics, propagates forces from the 
bottom of a hierarchy back up the chain of components (figure 1) (Elias).  
 
Figure 1:  Robot arm 01 
 
With regular or forward kinematics, to animate an arm picking up a ball we would first need to 
rotate the shoulder, extend the arm and open the palm before finally wrapping the fingers 
around the ball to clutch it. With inverse kinematics I define a series of properties for each joint, 
the shoulder is a ball and socket type joint, it can rotate within this range, the elbow can extend 
this far, fingers cannot bend backwards etc. Further each joint is given a weight or resistance, 
when we move naturally the hand opens early to anticipate grabbing the ball, the elbow moves 
quickly etc. Now once we have defined these relational properties between members, in inverse 
kinematics we simply grab the fingers and move them towards the target object, the other 
components automatically respond based on the properties of the joints in between. 
The difficulty arises when we ask the computer generated arm to find the object, rather than 
simply direct it towards the object manually (figure 2), especially for systems in which joint 
rotation can move across three axes. Whilst the starting point and goal object or target points of 
the arm are known and we can solve the shortest possible route between these points very 
easily, what is much more difficult is the solution for what angles the joints will assume during 
this movement. In fact for circumstances with 3 or more joints there is often no analytical 
solution to the problem (figure 3). 
 
 
Figure 2:  Robot arm 02 
 
 
Figure 3:  Robot arm 03 
 
Staying with this simple example, when we ask the computer to find the most efficient way, 
given the joint constraints, to find its object, one solution that is often used is to deploy an 
iterative algorithm (non-linear programming techniques are often the only ones that will be able 
to deliver any solutions to the problem). The iterative algorithm can be said to search the space 
of possible solutions from a given starting point, when more efficient values are returned they 
are favoured over less efficient ones. The space of possible solutions can be called a search 
space for the algorithm.  
What does a search space look like? (figure 4) In the case of this robot arm, we could assign to 
each joint a variable measured in degrees. Plotting each of the rotational ranges of each joint on 
separate axis would allow us to describe a space bounded by the 180 degree limit of the 
maximum extension of each joint. 
 
 
Figure 4:  Graph 
 
What is critical here is to understand here is that this graph is not a representation of the real 
two dimensional space in which the arm exists, we could not simply super-impose the arm onto 
this graph because the graph is measuring degrees and the physical space of the robot arm 
picture would be measured in distance units. What this graph is showing is all the potential 
configurations of joint angles in the arm. We can see that two points on the graph refer to the 
two combinations of angles on each joint that will get us to the target.  
The darker areas show combinations of joint angles that get the hand closer to the target, the 
lighter areas show combinations of joint angles that move the arm further away from the target. 
This landscape describes all possible combinations of movement for the arm- it is a perfectly 
complete description. This space of possibility can be subdivided infinitely, there are literally 
countless ways of occupying this space, and yet it is an infinity that is delimited by the extent of 
the graph. More interestingly however we note that it is not an undifferentiated space, it is 
literally a landscape (figure 5). The algorithm is simply a machine that explores the landscape 
by looking for the minimum or darkest point using mathematical differentiation, similar to trying 
to find the maxima or minima on a curve. 
 
 
Figure 5:  Graph landscape 
 
We can treat any system in which we can describe the degrees of freedom of its parts in the 
same way. Conceptually, we might therefore treat the landscape as more than an expression of 
possibility but as the very field that determines the behaviour of the system (figure 6). Crudely 
speaking we could reverse the causal chain and see the properties of the graph or landscape 
driving the arm and not the other way around. This is how evolutionary or algorithmic design 
processes operate. Evolutionary design processes produce iterations of form by populating 
successive locations in these spaces. Formal variation in the object is driven by the variation of 
the mathematical landscape occupied at any one time. Considering the system at this level 
provides a description of the overall tendencies, potentials and most importantly impossibilities 
that govern specific behaviour. The specific history of a system’s behaviour is given by the line 
a point inscribes as it is travelling across this mathematical surface. 
5 Basins of attraction and bifurcations 
The minima can be thought of as a basin of attraction (figure 7), so whenever the point tips over 
the precipice or edge of one of the higher contours it will drop into a different basin of attraction 
and thus change its behaviour. An attractor is a point that governs a specific pattern of 
behaviour (many attractors can exist in the same space). A basin of attraction is the zone of 
influence for the given attractor (when a point enters into a basin of attraction its behaviour is 
influenced by that attractor). A system poised at the border of two basins of attraction can be 
said to be at a bifurcation point (figure 8), with the slightest perturbation sending it into a 
different path. Stuart Kaufmann has suggested that complex systems can maximise their 
adaptability by locating themselves on these bifurcations zones, effectively increasing their 
freedom to change behaviour. 
“Networks on the boundary between order and chaos may have the flexibility to adapt 
rapidly and successfully through the accumulation of useful variations. In such poised 
systems, most mutations have small consequences because of the systems' homeostatic 
nature. A few mutations, however, cause larger cascades of change. Poised systems will 
therefore typically adapt to a changing environment gradually, but if necessary, they can 
occasionally change rapidly.” (Kaufmann 81) 
 
 
Figure 6:  System portrait 
 
 
Figure 7:  System basins 
 
 
Figure 8:  Bifurcation 
 
Though the robot arm is useful as a pedagogical device to explain a search space, it is a highly 
simplified example. For more complex systems we will not be able to use a two dimensional 
graph. In fact every degree of freedom in a system will require its own axis; therefore for a 
system with n-degrees of freedom we will need an n-dimensional space to describe it. 
Topological mathematics provides us with the resource to describe spaces of more than three 
dimensions. Topologically, a space can have an unlimited number of dimensions. The manifold 
is the mathematical 'description' of the state space; therefore the manifold describes all possible 
configurations of variables. A point located on the surface of that space will describe the 
particular configurations of each of the degrees of freedom of its component parts at any time, 
the movement of that point across this n-dimensional surface will describe the change in any of 
these potential configurations across time. This is essentially a meta-space that describes the 
systems potential. The specific behaviours of the system will emerge out of the constraints and 
tendencies of the topological space. It should be noted that there is some contention as to the 
status of these spaces with regards to the phenomena that they model. As Dyke notes:  
“State spaces can be called “heuristics”, “models”, “epistemological devices” or what ever 
you like. But whatever we call them, we cannot be justified in imagining a real world 
“process” of the successive piling up of constraints in as necessarily being mirrored in our 
successive manipulations of a matrix. The notion of a state space is an analytical tool we 
use to design research.”  (Dyke 14)  
Questions of fidelity or accuracy with regards to the phenomena being modelled are of course 
important in an analytical sense, but at no point can we say that there is an perfect equivalence 
between the phenomena and the model, only that certain salient characteristics of the 
phenomena have been incorporated into the modelling technique and that the these 
characteristics shape the rate and trajectory of an object as it moves through the model.  As 
Delanda suggests  
“(The) value of state space would be to reveal a topological isomorphism between 
singularities in the model and singularities in the physical system being modelled. “ 
(Delanda 147) 
6 Possibility 
This account of emergence as it has been described is still highly problematic for one very 
significant reason. If all the potential behaviours in a system are given at once as on the graph, 
and all that is left to occur is for them to be simply selected by a point in its trajectory through 
the model, then we are left with a system in which what is possible already pre-exists. Time 
would only operate to make real that which has always been a possibility located in space.   
Gilles Deleuze provides a very precise way of understanding this space of potential that accords 
to ‘time’ its properly creative function and thus opens the opportunity for novelty or newness. He 
achieves this via a critique of the categories; ‘possible’ and ‘real’.   
“Every time we pose the question in terms of possible and real, we are forced to conceive 
of existence as a brute eruption, a pure act or leap which always occurs behind our 
backs and is subject to a law of all or nothing. What difference can there be between the 
existent and the non-existent if the non-existent is already possible, already included in 
the concept and having all the characteristics that the concept confers upon it as a 
possibility? 
…to the extent that the possible is open to ‘realisation’, it is understood as an image of 
the real, while the real is supposed to resemble the possible. That is why it is so difficult 
to understand what existence adds to the concept when all it does is double like with like. 
Such is the defect of the possible: a defect which serves to condemn it as produced after 
the fact, as retroactively fabricated in the image of what it resembles. “(Deleuze.2:211) 
For Deleuze a stable topology in which what is available to actualization already exists, is not 
worth having, since all it does is make real what previously existed as a possibility, thus 
doubling ‘like with like’.  
“That is to say, we give ourselves a real that is ready-made, preformed, pre-existant to 
itself, and that will pass into existence according to an order of successive limitations. 
Everything is already completely given: all of the real in the image, in the pseudo 
actuality of the possible.” (Deleuze. 98) 
7 The virtual 
This state space or landscape of potential is what Deleuze would refer to as the virtual, with one 
important qualification that we will come to. The virtual is not physical and yet it is real, further 
not only is it real but it provides the generative space out of which physical form is developed. 
What is physical would be an actualisation of a particular location on this topological landscape.  
As Bonta and Protevi have noted, the qualification that must be introduced, is that for Deleuze a 
properly virtual topology is unstable and dynamic (Bonta and Protevi 27). That is, the reservoir 
of potential forms out of which physical form emerges, is itself subject to variation. This is critical 
for Deleuze’s ontology, because the stakes must not be limited to the variation in action that can 
take place within the limits of the system, what must be at stake is the very form of the virtual 
itself. A strongly emergent system is one in which this reservoir of potential is in variation with 
itself, so that what is available for development is itself subject to change. Weakly emergent 
systems would be systems in which the topology- that is the reservoir of potential forms on 
which actualisation processes can draw- is relatively stable and given only to local 
reconfigurations. This distinction between weak and strong emergence thus directly relates to 
type of spaces from which variation can potentially draw. It explains the limits of possible 
difference.  
The point of understanding conceptually if not mathematically, all these features and their 
terminology, is that an emergent approach to design means that these specific articulations and 
characteristics of the virtual world become the levers and instruments, or better; the 
morphogenetic drives and structuring forces available to the designer. Understanding those 
singular zones of a systems topology- those areas of the virtual landscape in which behaviour is 
balanced between two different states- means that we know when and where to apply pressure 
to shift a systems behaviour. More importantly it promises an economy of effect since only a 
minimal effort is required to tip a system poised on the cusp of two different states.   
                                                                                                                                                             
8 Notes 
1 It is important to note that that this mathematical space in which variations of the objects exist 
is not infinite in extension, it is bounded and has limits, rather we should say that it is infinite in 
density-a bounded infinity.  
2 What emerges with a new medium or practice more than a set of techniques or methodologies 
is a new series of problems in which existing techniques and concepts must be recast. Just as 
the ‘problem’ of authenticity only emerges with photography and mechanical reproduction, 
emergence carries with it its own series of lures and traps whose effect will be felt outside of the 
confines of computational or digital approaches to design. 
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